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Abstract In this paper the evolution of consumption is explained on the basis of a
theory that connects preferences over actions to the motivational forces driving actions.
More specifically, the hypotheses about what motivates consumption activities draw on
insights from biology, behavioral science, and psychology. With secularly rising
income, the growing consumption opportunities and the expanding consumption alter
the underlying motivational forces and induce a change of preferences. As a conse-
quence, the structure of consumption expenditures is systematically transformed. In the
light of this explanation, the paper analyzes the effects of the growth and transformation
of consumption on individual welfare. As turns out, the motivations driving the growth
of consumption do not necessarily imply that this growth indeed results in welfare
increases, particularly when the ability to spend on consumption is already high.
Moreover, when preferences change, the measurement of the welfare effects of the
growth and transformation of consumption depends on the arbitrary choice of a
reference point. This implies an ambiguity that raises further queries about the norma-
tive foundations of the ubiquitous calls for continued consumption growth.
Keywords Consumption . Growth . Satiation . Consumer learning . Preference change
JEL Classification A13 . D03 . D11 . D60 . O12 . Q01
J Evol Econ (2017) 27:273–293
DOI 10.1007/s00191-016-0459-3
I should like to thank Leonard Lades and the anonymous reviewers of this journal for extremely useful




1 Max Planck Institute for Science of Human History, Jena, Germany
2 Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Gold Coast, QL, Australia
1 Introduction
For millennia, poverty and starvation have been the fate of the largest part of human kind.
“Nature’s parsimony”, as Ricardo once put it, has only been overcome quite recently. Since
about two centuries, per capita income and consumption grow exponentially despite the
rapidly rising human population (Maddison 2001). In the most advanced economies,
already lower-income classes can now enjoy a standard of living that two centuries ago
would have resembled a state of affluence. The flip side of the massive growth of
consumption is an increasing toll on the natural environment. Both at a local and global
scale, climate change, resource depletion, soil and water degradation, species extinction,
and many other forms of environmental decay threaten the living conditions of future
generations (see, e.g., UNEP 2014). Nonetheless, motivated by the quest for better life,
calls for further economic growth still dominate in the political and public debate even in
the most prosperous economies. But, leaving aside the social costs for the moment, is it at
all likely that the equation “more consumption=better life” which was valid for the past
two centuries continues to hold? Do ever higher expenditures indeed assure steady
improvements in preference satisfaction irrespective of the level of consumption already
reached?
As is well known, canonical text book economics approaches these questions as
follows (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995). Consumer preferences are assumed to be
invariably given, i.e. the possibility of forming new preferences on innovations in goods
and services is ignored. What the consumers’ preferences are is not specified. They are
only claimed to satisfy some formal properties which imply utility functions that increase
monotonously with rising consumption expenditures. It then follows that consumers
always attain a higher utility index, i.e. realize a welfare gain, by spending more. The
equation “more consumption=better life” is guaranteed to hold. But can such a claim
indeed be made without knowing how consumers satisfy what preferences? Moreover,
can their preferences be taken as a invariable measuring rod for welfare that is independent
of what it is supposed to assess, namely the growing consumption possibilities (see Binder
2010 for a critical reappraisal)?
Doubts regarding the empirical relevance of such a portrayal of economic behavior
were raised early on (e.g., Veblen 1909, Sen 1977, Elster 1982). Evidence clearly points to
preferences that are neither always consistent nor invariably given. If it is admitted that
preferences do change, an inter-temporally consistent measuring rod for welfare may still
be logically possible. The necessary proviso is, however, that individual preferences only
change in a particular, unidirectional way (von Weizsäcker 2005, Bernheim and Rangel
2009). The relevance of this assumption cannot be assessed, of course, without a richer
understanding of the causes and mechanisms underlying the changes of consumer
preferences.
In order to advance this understanding a behavioral theory of preferences is needed.
The key to such a theory, it will be argued in this paper, lies in the relationships between
preferences over actions on the one side and the motivational forces driving actions on the
other. From a preference subjectivism point of view, asking what motivates consumers to
choose specific actions may appear futile, if it can be assumed that the reasons of choice
reside in the individuals’ inextricable subjective sphere. Admittedly, subjective idiosyn-
crasies are likely to result in some irreducible inter-personal variation in consumer
behavior. This does not mean, though, that there are no commonly shared motivational
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forces which exert a systematic influence on the mean behavior in the population. As
explained elsewhere (Witt 2001), among others innate needs and drives signify as human
universals and provide a basis for a generic analysis of the reasons of choice and, hence, of
the individuals’ revealed preferences.
Theories assisting an analysis of human motivation in general and the motivation to
consume in particular are interdisciplinary by their nature and refer to the evolutionary
bases of human behavior (see Brown and Richerson 2014). To better understand the
motivational forces and to develop a richer theory of preferences the present paper draws
on hypotheses from several disciplines. Among them are the biology of drives and needs
and of behavioral adaptations (Leslie 1996, Staddon 2014a, b), sociobiology (Wilson
1978), evolutionary psychology (Saad 2007), cognitive psychology (Bargh et al. 2010),
empirical happiness research (Kahneman et al. 1999), and also the revival of sensory
hedonism in economics (Kahneman et al. 1997). On this basis it can be discussed in detail
why and how consumption changes systematically with a growing income and what the
consequences are for human welfare.
The paper proceeds in three steps. Section 2 presents a brief review of relevant
biological, behavioral, and psychological hypotheses. They relate to innate (heritable),
learned (conditioned), and cognitive motivational forces. It is discussed how these forces
change and whether such changes imply a shift in preferences. Section 3 derives some
implications of these hypotheses for explaining the evolution of consumption. It is shown
that a crucial role is played on the one hand by multi-level learning processes which affect
existing motivations to consume, generate new ones, and thus induce preference changes.
On the other hand, the development is characterized by differences in the satiation
dynamics across different motivations. Both kinds of motivational changes become
manifest and transform consumer behavior as increases in per-capita income raise the
ability to spend and to learn new behaviors. Section 4 turns to the welfare-theoretic aspects
of the evolution of consumption, i.e. to the question of whether and when the equation
“more consumption=better life” holds true. As will turn out, the answer raises doubts
about how calling for yet more consumption growth can be justified even in the most
prosperous economies. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2 Motivational hypotheses as key for understanding preferences
Originally, motivational hypotheses were a center piece of utilitarian economics. In the
characteristic hedonistic interpretation, the reasons for taking actions were explained by
the utility derived thereby in terms of enjoying pleasures and/or avoiding pains (both
explicated in great detail). 1 Yet, in the later transformations of the utilitarian program,
motivational hypotheses fell victim to the belief that by “a purging out of objectionable,
and sometimes unnecessary connotations (of the Bentham, Sidgwick, Edgeworth variety)
… a much less objectionable doctrine” would result (Samuelson 1947, p.90). The new,
“less objectionable” doctrine in question was Samuelson’s own revealed preference
1 Motivational hypotheses “…describe why a person in a given situation selects one response over another or
makes a given response with greater energization or frequency”, Bargh et al. 2010, 286). If, for example, a
consumer chooses to buy food, the Benthamite explanation would be that this action is motivated by the
expectation of the pleasure of eating and/or the avoidance of the pain of hunger.
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theory. Now widely adopted in economic textbooks it can no longer explain what the
utility index represents (Glimcher 2015). Correspondingly, the sensory hedonistic theory
of welfare characteristic of the Benthamite tradition has given way to a positivist substitute
based on a hollow notion of preference satisfaction.
However, Samuelson’s revealed preference theory rests on a very strong concept of
“rational” decision making. Nourished by experimental research in decision science,
serious doubts have arisen more recently with respect to whether decision makers actually
live up to that rationality standard (Kahneman 2003, Ariely 2009). Decision making
anomalies and puzzles have caused behavioral economics to question Samuelson’s
doctrine and to again start a transformation of the theory of economic behavior
(Camerer and Loewenstein 2004). Actual choices are now portrayed as coming about in
two very different ways (Loewenstein 2000, Kahneman 2011). On one side there are the
cognitive, belief-based choices of actions. They are subject to a number of systematic
biases. On the other side, actions can be the result of unconditioned and conditioned
response behavior that is much less, if at all, cognitively reflected. (In terms of
Kahneman’s distinction between systems of decision-making these are the system 2 and
1, respectively.) Correspondingly, behavior can systematically change over time as a
consequence of either cognitive or non-cognitive learning processes.
Behavioral economics is thus much better able to account for the richness and
complexity of human decision making and learning. Yet, with few exceptions (e.g.
Loewenstein 2004), the question of what drives ormotivates economic behavior continues
to be left out, and welfare theory remains bound to a hollow preference satisfaction
criterion (Burnham et al. 2015). To make progress on this front, the results of motivational
research in the neighboring sciences have to be integrated into the behavioral approach to
economics. A first important step is to recognize that, in choosing their actions, human
decision makers follow different kinds of motivations depending on time and
circumstances.
A basic motivational force is constituted by innate needs and drives. As part of the
genetic endowment, such needs represent human universals. They are therefore a good
starting point for identifying generic features of human preferences, i.e. features that,
excepting the genetic variance, are widely shared among humans. A significant feature
of these needs is the role that need deprivation plays for motivating action. The more
deprived a need is, the stronger is the motivation to take actions that are directed at
reducing or removing deprivation. If the need is satiated, deprivation vanishes and so
does the motivation to act.
For needs related to the biological metabolism of the body, deprivation can be easily
identified by symptoms of physiological imbalance or deficiency. The need for food can
serve as example. Feeling hungry motivates organisms to engage in foraging behavior.
The foraging motivation vanishes once caloric intake reaches the satiation level – albeit
reappears when these calories have been burned off. Similar homoeostatic patterns are
present for needs such as for water, sleep, food, physical activity, sex, shelter, and
clothing, i.e. protecting the body against pain and cold. Prominent needs not directly
related to the biology of the body are those for affection, care, sensory and cognitive
stimulation (or “arousal”), positive self-image, and status and social recognition. They
are also contingent on an existing state of deprivation. The motivation to act is again
directed at reducing or removing deprivation. However, the question of whether and
how satiation of the needs is eventually attained is more complex (see below).
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Consider an action that is motivated by the attempt to satisfy one or several (possibly
differently) deprived needs by means of consuming one or several goods. A particular
need may be served by consuming several different goods and/or a combination of
them. Further, the consumption of one and the same good may serve not only one, but
several needs simultaneously. Goods having this feature may be called “combination
goods”. For example, eating something can be motivated by a deprived need for food,
more precisely for calories. But eating something, i.e. experiencing varied taste, scent,
texture, and other properties of food, can simultaneously also serve the satisfaction of a
deprived need for sensory stimulation (arousal). In this sense, food can be a combina-
tion good. 2 Similarly, housing expenditures are not only motivated by the need for
shelter, but often also by a deprived need for status and social recognition (Frank 2007).
In terms of a utilitarian representation these conditions can be captured as follows.
Suppose at the time of making a choice a decision maker conceives of a set of action
options which appear to be feasible given the decision makers budget constraint. Each
action option i in the set consists of consuming a bundle of goods and services j=1,…,m
that is described by a vector xi=(xi1,…, xij,…, xim). If xi would serve need h exclusively,
the partial utility derived from satisfying need h by the corresponding action would be
given in the familiar form by
uh ¼ uh xið Þ: ð1Þ
Satiability of a need h thenmeans that the partial utility function (1) has amaximum – the
bliss point. If feasible, satiation is attained by consuming a (not necessarily unique) need-
specific vector xh of goods by which the bliss point with respect to h is reached.
However, often the assumption that a consumption activity serves one need exclu-
sively is not satisfied. Some of the m goods included in a consumption bundle can be
combination goods, i.e. serve to satisfy several needs and other action motivations (such
as those discussed below) simultaneously. Consider for the moment a set N of innate
needs with elements h=1, …, n. The total utility UN derived by their satisfaction
through the consumption of the bundle xi is therefore determined by the functional
UN ¼ UN u1 xið Þ; …; un xið Þ
 
: ð2Þ
i.e. the product or the sum (depending on the specification of the functional) of partial
utilities which xi generates with respect to each of the n needs.
The question is how the vector x* that maximizes UN subject to the income
constraint is determined. 3 Formally, the solution can be found by calculus of variation.
2 Combination goods typically possess several characteristics in the sense of Lancaster (1971). However, there
is no unique correspondence between characteristics and needs: one characteristic can be relevant for several
needs and several characteristics for one need.
3 If the available budget allows to reach the bliss point of need h, the motivation to further expand
consumption serving need h vanishes by definition. However, a consumption bundle may include combina-
tions goods that serve other, less rapidly satiable, consumption motivations as well. In the optimum, these
motivations can drive the consumption of a combination good j beyond the bliss point of one or some of the
involved needs. Put differently, due to the existence of combination goods, maximizing the utility functional
(2) can result in x*j > x j; h for some h.
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However, in animal studies it has been found that the brain of higher animals – not to
speak of humans – is capable of generating in an automatic fashion a single, aggregate
value for each of the actions in the set of perceived options as long as that set is small
enough. This provides the basis for choosing the highest option value automatically. 4
In economic diction, the option values can be interpreted as an automatically generated
prediction of total utility associated with the different actions or consumption bundles
(Glimcher 2015). Accordingly, UN gives a measure of the spontaneously emerging
motivation for undertaking specific consumption activities in order to satisfy a (set of)
deprived innate need(s).
This motivation is subject to two different kinds of systematic change over time. On
the one hand this is the satiation dynamics which will be discussed in more detail in the
next section. It reduces in a way specific to each single need the motivation to consume
contingent on the amount consumed (per period) to serve the need. On the other hand
there is a learning dynamics that changes the relative strength of the motivation across
different needs as a result of the experienced relative success in obtaining need
satisfaction. This works as follows. If the choice of a particular consumption activity
indeed reduces the degree of deprivation of the underlying need, the effect is a
rewarding experience by the decision maker. Such an event has been demonstrated in
behavioral research to be an instance of primary reinforcement. 5 Since there are usually
many alternative consumption activities serving different needs in different ways, the
motivation to choose among them is adapted by reinforcement learning to the respec-
tive relative rewards experienced to result in terms of relative need satisfaction.
Put differently, the motivation to act adapts to the decision maker’s opportunities for
obtaining reward by consuming different consumption bundles. These opportunities
depend on economic factors such as availability, relative prices, and income, but also
on the agents’ ability or comparative advantages in experiencing a reward feeling by
some actions rather than others. As a consequence of these differences, consumers tend
to “specialize” in many different ways, e.g., as gourmets, computer freaks, opera lovers,
bodybuilders, spiritualists, and so on. Indeed, a significant part of the empirically
observable adaptations over time in idiosyncratic consumer behavior described, but
not explained further, in the literatures as “habit formation” (see Pollak 1970, and
1978), can be attributed to such specialization processes guided by reinforcement
learning.
Besides adaptations in the frequency of a set of given actions through reinforcement
learning there is yet another behavioral mechanism that is heritable and contributes to
behavior adaptations. It is labeled conditioning learning and works as follows (Leslie
1996, Chap. 2.13). Suppose a particular action consisting of consuming good j is
observed to occur. Suppose further that it results in a rewarding experience so that it
is subject to primary reinforcement. Now assume that this action (the consumption of
4 See Shizgal (1999). Automatic here means that the neural processes involved in the generation of the option
(or predicted reward) values occur at the non-cognitive level. Although the processes are not yet fully
understood, it seems that they are represented by the local dopamine concentrations. The generating processes
are strongly context-dependent and may be conditioned by neurochemical influences (Glimcher 2015); see
also Schultz (2002) and Daw and Tobler (2013).
5 Staddon and Cerutti (2003). It should be noted, however, that the deprivation of innate needs is not a
necessary condition for reinforcement to occur in the behavior of a species.
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good j) happens to coincide with the consumption of another good k which is
experienced as neither rewarding nor aversive in itself. If the coincidence recurs several
times, the rewarding experience resulting from consuming good j comes to be associ-
ated with the consumption of good k. By virtue of this association, consuming good k
starts to be reinforced as well. In this vein, good k emerges as a conditioned or
secondary reinforcer.
The correlate of this kind of reinforcer is a new, spontaneously emerging motiva-
tional force for which utility is then also automatically predicted. For sake of distinction
call it an “acquired want”. 6 In this way, a new, not previously existing preference for
the corresponding action is created. It typically involves new or not previously consid-
ered goods and services. Hence, the dimensionality of the utility functional (2), defined
above for the innate needs in isolation, has to be expanded (see Eq. (3) below). The
effect of conditioning learning thus goes beyond mere habit formation. The extension is
crucial for explaining how innovations enter and alter consumer preferences and, it will
be argued below, for understanding the evolution of consumption.
So far the motivation driving consumer behavior and the learning processes that
modify it have been discussed as phenomena occurring at a non-cognitive level.
However, a characteristic of human behavior is that a motivation to act and related
learning processes can be triggered at the cognitive level as well. First, relating to the
above discussion of innate needs it has to be added that there are needs of genuinely
cognitive nature such as the need for autonomy (Hagger et al. 2006) and the need for a
positive self-image and self-esteem (see, e.g., Gollwitzer and Kirchhof 1998,
Pyszczynski et al. 2004). Their motivational force derives from states of deprivation
as in the case of the previously discussed needs. The need for a positive self-image is
particularly relevant for consumption behavior (Lades 2012a). If one’s self-image is
cast in doubt, the cognitive dissonance that arises causes a situation of need deprivation
that prompts strong aversive emotions. In order to reduce deprivation, decision makers
are often motivated to engage in consumption activities that symbolize their ideal self-
image, if no other options for restoring a positive self-image are feasible (Dunning
2007).
Second, a major way in which the motivation to act is modified is cognitive
deliberation and insightful learning. They lead to cognitive goal-setting and its moti-
vational correlate, goal-striving (i.e. the deliberate pursuit of the goals and sub-goals
whose accomplishment is experienced as rewarding, see Bargh et al. 2010). In the
context of consumption behavior, goal-striving can be directed at accomplishing
cognitively constructed objectives for their own sake such as the satisfaction of
efficiency, safety, or convenience considerations by consuming suitable goods and
6 See Witt (2001). To give an example, let good j be gyros or any other dishes served in the hotel restaurant
while on vacation in Greece. Let good k be the Sirtaki music that is continuously played in the restaurant.
Assume that for the consumer this music is an entirely new and initially neutral experience. Conditioning
learning between eating the dishes and listening to the music can then result in Sirtaki music becoming an
acquired want, i.e. a rewarding experience in its own right. For the effect of conditioning learning to be
maintained, the association between consuming goods j and kmust at least sporadically be reaffirmed. For that
reason, it is possible for acquired wants to be “unlearned”. Despite some common cultural influences, the
idiosyncrasies of the individuals’ conditioning histories cause a substantial inter-personal variation with
respect to what wants are acquired.
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services. But goal-striving can also be instrumental in the context of means-ends
relationships, i.e. when the motivation originates from some “deeper” needs or wants
whose pursuit is cognitively controlled. 7 In any case, the motivation to act depends also
on the cognitive goal-setting process, on how means-ends relationships are constructed,
and on how the agents discount the time factor.
To account for the utility derived from satisfying acquired wants and cognitive goals,
the functional depicting total utility has to be extended to U= U(UN, UW, UG). UW and
UG are utility functionals constructed analogously to Eq. (2). They represent the utility
generated by the satisfaction of acquired wants and the accomplishing of cognitive
goals respectively. If the number of acquired wants is given by w and the number of
cognitive goals by g, we get as the extended total utility functional
U ¼ U u1 xið Þ; …; un xið Þ; unþ1 xið Þ; …; unþw xið Þ; unþwþ1 xið Þ; …; unþwþg xið Þ
 
; ð3Þ
In its full complexity, utility maximization thus requires finding a vector x* that
maximizes the extended utility functional (3).
The analysis is complicated by the fact that goal-setting often leads to contemplating
not previously recognized consumption activities including new goods and services so
that the perceived choice set is extended. 8 The same holds when, by conditioning
processes, associations with new consumption activities are learned. If a consumer
innovation s (a smart phone, say) is introduced to the market and recognized by the
consumer as a choice option, the vector of goods and services is extended to
xl= (xl1,…, xlm, xls). As a consequence, the dimensionality of the total utility functional
(3) expands accordingly.
3 Motivational change and the evolution of consumption: the differential
satiation hypothesis
In its process of growth, consumption has been undergoing significant transfor-
mations. In order to explain the evolution of consumption, focus in this section
is on the reaction which the consumers in an economy show when their
income, i.e. their ability to spend, increases. This means that, as usual, the
reaction will be explored at the level of population averages. They are de-
scribed in terms of the income elasticities of consumption expenditures and/or
Engel curves. The latter depict the variation in the size of the diverse aggregate
household expenditure categories as a function of income. Engel curves come
in two versions (see Chai and Moneta 2010). One version focuses on the
variation of expenditures on particular consumption categories across different
7 Humans can train themselves to delay the rewarding experience of goal attainment, i.e. the ultimate
gratification in terms of the need or want satisfaction, until a date far into the future by “mental time traveling”
(Suddendorf and Corballis 1997).
8 The proviso is, of course, that the increasing number of alternatives does not make the decision maker forget
options she was previously aware of. Cognitive learning processes are always selective with respect to what
new consumption possibilities gain attention. For that reason, cognitive learning contributes to consumer
specialization.
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income classes at a given time. The other (longitudinal) version describes the
changes of the size of the different expenditure categories when the average
household income in the economy rises over time. Engel curves (as well as
income elasticities) are descriptive tools. They allow to visualize and classify
empirical observed changes of consumption, but they do not allow to explain
them.
To fill the theoretical gap that exists here we can draw on the motivational
hypotheses outlined in the previous section. The question then is whether and,
if so, how income-induced changes of consumer expenditures differ depending
on the purpose they serve: to satisfy innate needs, acquired wants, or cognitive
goal-striving. Hence, the relevant version of the Engel curve is given by the
function
X ht ¼ X ht I tð Þ; ð4Þ
where Xht denotes the expenditures of the households in the economy in a
period of time t (usually a year) on a category of goods and services whose
consumption is motivated by the force h= 1,…, n+w+ z. It denotes average
household income (exclusive of savings). 9
To begin the discussion of how the motivational forces can be conjectured to
shape aggregate consumption patterns when rising income enables higher
spending consider the innate needs first. Consumers share these needs (with
some variation). Their responses can therefore be assumed to be similar and,
hence, properly represented by the empirically observable time series of the
national averages of the household expenditures. Regarding the average reaction
to rising income, two hypotheses can be proposed. One hypothesis relates to
the average expenditure corresponding to the bliss points of the consumers’
partial utility function (4). In terms of real prices, they can be expected to
correspond to the satiation level. The second hypothesis is that, X h is not
equally rapidly approached for all n needs when the expenditures serving them
are increased. Let there be two needs f (food) and a (arousal) and assume that f
is more rapidly satiable than a. This means that the income at which X f is
reached according to Eq. (4) is lower than the income at which Xā is reached.
When income grows, the motivation for additional spending on need f levels
off earlier than in case of need a. Likewise, the income level at which the
expenditure or budget share σft = Xft/It starts to decrease is lower than the
income level at which σat start to decrease.
The need for food or, more precisely, calorie intake is indeed a good
example of a satiable need. The empirical evidence for a decreasing expenditure
9 Maximization of Eq. (3) subject to an expanding budget constraint results in individual income-expenditure
curves for the goods and services. These curves for the individual consumers could, in principle, be summed
over all consumers yielding the aggregate Engel curves. A prerequisite is, however, that the growing income
does not result in preference changes through the emergence of new wants and cognitive goals and/or in an
expansion of the choice set by consumer innovations. This condition is not met during the evolution of
consumption. Instead of a “micro foundation”, i.e. the aggregation step by which Eq. (4) would be derived
from Eqs. (3) and (4) is therefore directly based here on the available aggregate household expenditure data.
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share is very robust. 10 Data for a whole century available for the U.S. show
that per-capita income has risen in real terms by a factor of 6 between 1901
and 2002. Over the same period, the share of household expenditures on food
declines from 42.5 % to 13.1 % (Chao and Utgoff 2006). The shrinking
expenditure share notwithstanding, the convergence to the satiation level can,
of course, be delayed by the fact that other, less rapidly satiable needs than that
for calorie intake may simultaneously motivate the consumption of food. As
already mentioned, this may be the need for arousal (or sensory and cognitive
stimulation) which, for reasons explained below, is not that rapidly satiable.
Eating snacks at all occasions outside the main meals or having “refreshment” drinks
etc. may become a form of entertainment which results in buying more foodstuff (quantity
effect). If not simply wasted, the additional food drives up calorie consumption – often
even beyond the satiation level for calories with the consequence of a growing body
weight. The need for arousal can be conjectured to also contribute to the rapidly growing
away-from-home food consumption, particularly when it involves sampling restaurants
offering foreign cuisines. Moreover, the need for arousal seems to drive a trend to
consuming more refined, exotic, and in any case more expensive, “gourmet” food (quality
effect). 11 Another example of a motivation influencing food consumption which also
seems to induce a quality effect is cognitive goal striving related to health and life-style
considerations.
When, as a result of an increasing satiation, the motivation that previously dominated
the growth of consumption levels off, this means that the respective consumer goods
industry is confronted with increasing market saturation. The need for calorie intake is a
case in point. The food industry typically responds by creating innovations that in some
way try to shift the bound at which the consumption motivation is satiated. 12 A frequent
strategy aims at triggering a quality effect by appealing to other, less easily satiable
10 Pooling long term data from the UN National Accounts Statistics for 64 countries, Kaus (2012) estimates
cross-country Engel curves for all COICOP (UN classification of individual consumption according to
purpose) expenditure categories. The estimate for food expenditures clearly supports the theoretically expected
relationship dσ f =dt ¼ ∂σ f∂I t
dI t
dt < 0 for the budget share σf of food.
11 Given that calorie content is an objective measure, food consumption is a good example to illustrate the two
effects. Let a composite commodity j be the only good that serves the need for calorie intake (a food basket
whose elements are consumed in fixed proportions, say). Assume that xj units, each with calorie content cj, are
consumed on average per period (time index suppressed for convenience). The result is an average intake of (i)
qj = cjxj calories per period. If pj denotes the price, the average food expenditure is (ii) Xj = pjxj. By inserting (i)
into (ii) the expenditure satiation level follows as (iii) X j ¼
p j
c j
q, where q is the satiation level for calories.
However, if the consumption of j is also motivated by additional, less rapidly satiable needs, this may lead to
X j > X j when income increases sufficiently, i.e. the quantity effect implying waste of food and/or overeating.
The additional motivations may, of course, also induce a higher willingness to pay for a recomposed
commodity with similar calorie content but more entertaining features. Since the price per calorie pj/cj in
eq. (iii) represents a degree of freedom, accepting a higher price shifts X j upwards – the quality effect. For an
empirical study of the effects see Manig and Moneta (2014). In elasticity terms, the two effects can be






12 In a study of the history of sugar consumption, Ruprecht (2005) shows that the food industry in the U.S.
responded in the 1960s to growing dietary health and life style concerns (a concomitant of rising per-capita
income) by innovative products. Sugar as high-calorie sweeteners was replaced by artificial, low-calorie
sweeteners as, e.g. in the newly introduced Diet Coke. By eq. (iii) in footnote 11 a reduction of cj shifts X j
upwards.
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motivations than the need for calories. Examples are foodstuffs with new features or
combinedwith additional services aiming to provide additional sensory stimulation or to
appeal to cognitive goal striving informed by health and life-style motives. The inci-
dence of quality and quantity effects and product innovation explains in good part why
food expenditures, despite their declining share in the household budgets, still increase
in absolute terms. In the U.S., for example, the increase from 1901 to 2002 was 46 %
calculated in $ of 2002 (Chao and Utgoff 2006).
Why are other motivations underlying consumption behavior less rapidly satiable
than homoeostatic biological needs such as the one for calorie intake? Regarding the
need for arousal this can be explained as follows. The need is in a state of deprivation
whenever the sensory and cognitive system lacks sufficiently strong stimuli. One may
think here of the nagging feeling of boredom described by Scitovsky (1981). Owing to
such boredom, a motivation to act emerges. It drives consumers to seek out actions
which trigger pleasant sensory and/or cognitive stimulation, e.g. “entertaining” con-
sumption activities. (The stimuli are perceived as pleasant if they are neither too strong
nor too weak, an assessment contingent on the strength of previous stimulations.)
However, the removal of deprivation by such activities is only a transitory episode,
because it is subject to a stupefaction effect or, in utilitarian terms, to hedonic
adaptation.
Increases in spending temporarily raise the level of arousal. But as the adaptation to
this level of stimulation proceeds, deprivation of the need reemerges, and with it the
motivation to act. In comparison, in the case of the need for calorie intake, deprivation
regularly recurs as well but can be reduced by repeating the same consumption activity.
In the case of the need of arousal the stupefaction effect prevents this. Rather,
consumption activities are required which offer stronger stimuli. They can be obtained
by switching to goods and services that are usually more expensive – if a growing
income makes such an option feasible. 13
The potential for unceasing growth in expenditures corresponding to the need for
arousal was, in fact, already envisioned by Scitovsky (1976). Cognitive and sensory
stimulation can be obtained by a multitude of consumption activities, many of which
may simultaneously serve other needs and wants as well. Striving to satisfy this innate
need can therefore be argued to represent an essential motivational force which
underlies overall consumption growth. Its influence is especially prominent, however,
for the massive growth of the household budget shares of two expenditure categories
able to attend to the need for arousal. One of them is “recreation” (including tourism). 14
The other is “entertainment” (including consumer electronics, communication, and
social media). Using the example of the U.S. household data again spending on this
category grew from 54 $ per year in 1901 to 828 $ in 2002, i.e. by factor 15, (calculated
in $ of 2002), the highest relative increase among all expenditures categories (Chao and
Utgoff 2006).
13 The history of tourism and of the entertainment industry offers much evidence, see Chai (2007). One of his
instructive examples is that of the British working class that considered at the end of the 19th century a leisure
trip to Blackpool as major source of arousal. To nowadays reach a level of arousal comparable to the one once
elicited by a trip to Blackpool, it is necessary to venture as far as the Balearic Islands or so.
14 The Engel curve corresponding to this expenditure category shows the most consistent, monotonous
increase among all expenditures categories in the cross-country estimations conducted by Kaus (2012) on
the data mentioned in footnote 10.
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A similar adaptation process is also present in the case of the need for
positive self-image. Consumers can temporarily reduce an annoying discrepancy
between how they currently perceive themselves and their ideal self-image – i.e.
a deprivation of their need for a positive self-image – by engaging in con-
sumption activities symbolic of the ideal individual they would like to be. This
is particularly true for consumers who tend to define their ideal self-image in
terms of material possessions (Lades 2012a, b, Chap. 5). When, as usual, the
ideal is not really attainable by the symbolic consumption activities, the dis-
crepancy between the actual and ideal self-image recurs and triggers a motiva-
tion to engage in an intensified symbolic consumption. For economies with a
high per-capita income it can be expected that the budget shares of expendi-
tures on goods and services typically serving that need tend to rise over time.
Among them are, e.g., jewelry, and other personal accessoires, cosmetics,
cosmetic surgery, “fitness” enhancing goods and services, bodybuilding, anti-
aging products.
The reason for why the motivation to consume is not rapidly satiable is a
different one in the case of the need for status and social recognition. Com-
paring oneself to others is an innate human tendency. Through this comparison,
a state of deprivation can be caused when one’s status is felt deficient relative
to the status of those to whom one is compared, or to whom one compares
oneself. This is often the case when one feels insufficiently recognized espe-
cially by one’s peer group. Actions aiming at a status improvement by which
deprivation would be reduced are then usually informed by comparisons with
individuals or groups just above oneself in the hierarchy (Frank et al. 2014). In
economic diction, the preference for status and social recognition therefore
represents a positional preference (Hirsch 1978). 15
In many social environments, personal income would count as a major
determinant of relative social status – if income were reliably observable. Since
this is rarely the case, proxies for income, such as the life style one can afford,
serve to assess the relative size of income. In case of a deprived need for status
and social recognition one can therefore try to signal an improved status by
engaging in suitable consumption activities. Goods and services one buys in
order to signal status have to be visible to, and appreciated by, those one wants
to impress (Heffetz 2011). Whether this condition is fulfilled by a particular
consumption item is largely a matter of conventions that are specific to groups
and strata in society (Witt 2011). Moreover, consumption must be sufficiently
exclusive so that the status signal cannot easily be imitated. Buying expensive
status symbols not economically feasible for those with lower income is a way
of ensuring exclusiveness. Examples are large, i.e. expensive, homes, exclusive
furniture, fancy cars, jewelry, luxury wristwatches, expensive clothes, visits to
exclusive clubs, bars, restaurants, hotel (Charles et al. 2009).
15 In order to account for positional preferences, the model in Section 2 would have to be extended. Not only
the own action and corresponding consumption vector would have to be entered into the individual partial
utility function (1) specific to the status need but also those of the comparison group. The individual total
utility functional (3) would have to be expanded accordingly.
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However, if consumers strive to gain social recognition and status by imitating
individuals or groups just above them in the social hierarchy, the exclusiveness and
status-differentiating effect of symbolic consumption is continually challenged when
income is secularly rising. Ever more consumers can then afford to engage in the
consumption activities symbolizing a higher status. The consequence is a status-
consumption race that on average just preserves everyone’s relative status position
(Hirsch 1978, Frank 1999 and 2011).16 Due to this inherently instable situation, the
budget share of status-related aggregate consumption expenditures can be expected to
rise over time, if per-capita income is growing. Empirical evidence supports this
hypothesis, 17 as also the long time series of the U.S. household budget shares shows:
housing expenditures rose from 23.3 % in 1901 to 32.8 % in 2002, or (in $ of 2002)
from $806 in 1901 to $5344 in 2002.
When the growth of income and of the ability to spend continues, innate
needs that cannot rapidly be satiated (in an enduring manner) can thus be
expected to increasingly be the drivers of the growth of consumption. This
argument has been developed exemplarily here for the needs for status and
social recognition, arousal, and a positive self-image. The relative insatiability
of such needs causes a massive substitution processes and restructuring of the
consumer goods industries as rising income brings expenditures on “basic”
needs to the point of satiation. However, the less rapidly, or not at all, satiable
needs are not the only drivers of the further growth of consumption and its
changing composition. Preference learning through conditioning and cognitive
learning as it has been discussed for acquired wants and cognitive goal setting
also play a decisive role. Wants and goals that presently exist could eventually
be satisfied with rising income. Yet, the fact that new wants and goals are
learned over and again prevents this form of consumption motivation from ever
vanishing.
The two kinds of learning are a concomitant of the previously described
specialization of consumers in particular activities. The more specialization
proceeds, the finer are the distinctions between products and services which
consumers can make and the more refined their demand becomes. By the same
token a willingness to pay is created for differences that non-specialized
consumers are unable to appreciate or even to recognize. In this way, consumer
specialization generates opportunities for ever new niche markets that would not
be viable without substantial consumer expertise and sophisticated preferences.
The consumer goods industries are eager to fill these niches by actively nurturing the
consumers’ learning and preference formation processes in order to postpone market
saturation. A frequent promotion activity is, for example, the attempt to create by
16 Status-signaling by means of consumption activities conforming to social norms that change in a trickle-
down fashion across social strata can also result in delayed or not enduring need satisfaction. See the
discussion of “fashion cycles” in Weidlich and Brenner (1995) and Chai et al. (2007) or of personal cleanliness
norms slowly winding up in Woersdorfer (2010).
17 Kaus (2012) follows Charles et al. (2009) and identifies status-signaling behavior with the expenditure
categories “housing & utilities”, “furnishings & household equipment”, “transport”, and “miscellaneous goods
& services”. Based on the data mentioned in footnote 10 he estimates cross-country Engel curves for each of
these expenditure categories and finds the hypothesis supported.
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various means an association between newly launched products and primary reinforc-
ing instances. The intention is to induce consumers to acquire a preference for the
products by conditioning learning at a non-cognitive level. Another promotion strategy
aims at the cognitive level. It consists in highlighting product features such as func-
tionality, efficiency, convenience, flexibility, reliability, or safety which are believed to
appeal to the consumers’ means-ends-reflections and in this way to elicit cognitive
motivation for a buying decision. 18
4 Implications for human welfare: when is more consumption better?
The hypotheses developed in the previous sections offer a basis for analyzing how the
evolution of consumption affects human welfare or well-being (terms used synony-
mously here). The point of departure is again the role played by the motivations
underlying consumer behavior. More specifically the question is: do welfare improve-
ments depend on how growing consumption expenditures are motivated? Put differ-
ently, does it matter for the welfare assessment what preferences the growing con-
sumption expenditures are intended to satisfy? Questions like these are not part of the
agenda of modern welfare economics. Lacking hypotheses about the content of
preferences, welfare judgments are derived – following the logic of revealed preference
theory – from the assumption that all actions are chosen voluntarily in a rational way. It
is inferred, therefore, that if they would not make consumers better off (whatever their
preferences are) they would not be chosen. It then follows that the growth of consump-
tion means a welfare improvement or, to put it that way, enables consumers to live a
better life.
Under conditions of poverty and starvation (as in some countries still
prevalent today) it may stand to reason that being able to consume more indeed
amounts to a “better life”. In the high-income economies, however, the reality
of consumption has moved far beyond such conditions, and the growing
expenditures serve purposes whose welfare-improving effects are not so obvi-
ous. Phenomena such as hedonic adaptation, self-image problems, and position-
al (status) preferences, raise doubts about the welfare-enhancing quality of these
choices. In addition, individual preferences may change when the set of known
options is growing and/or changing. For assessing the welfare effects of the
18 How consumer learning and supply-side promotion of innovations jointly drive consumption growth and
transform an industry has been highlighted by Frenzel Baudisch (2006) in his case study of the U.S. footwear
industry. American consumers traditionally owned and, hence, bought relatively few pairs of shoes until in the
early 1970s. Correspondingly, until then footwear demand had an income elasticity smaller than one. From
that time on, however, the income elasticity turned greater than one. The reason was the unfolding of an
innovative, functional diversification of footwear after the monopoly of the United Shoes Machinery Com-
pany was broken up in the late 1950s. Starting with the athletic shoes fashion wave new materials and new
production methods allowed not only more rapidly changing fashion colors, forms, textures, and design-driven
branding (adding status signaling and entertaining features to the function of footwear). The industry also
began to massively advertise speciality shoes for each and every different purpose (appealing to cognitive goal
striving). U.S. consumers responded by purchasing and owning significantly more shoes per period so that,
notwithstanding the fact that the average price fell, footwear expenditures started to grow more rapidly than
per-capita income.
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evolution of consumption it is therefore essential to go beyond a theory based
on an unexplained preference order or utility index. A behavioral welfare theory
needs to account for the impact of the different motivations and the effects of
the corresponding adaptation mechanisms.
To start with, consider first the preferences related to innate needs in isolation. In
terms of the model in Section 2, satiability of an innate need h means that the partial
utility function (1) has a maximum corresponding to a need-specific vector xh (con-
sumed per period of time). As explained, examples of needs for which a bliss point can
comparatively rapidly be reached when consumption grows steadily are those for food,
clothes, and shelter. Typically, deprivation of these needs is associated with poverty and
starvation. Not accidentally, needs like these have been labeled “basic needs” in
development economics, and their satisfaction was considered part of the essential
requirements for human existence (Streeten and Burki 1978). Actions implying an
increased consumption of goods serving these needs do raise welfare provided the
satiation level of the needs has not yet been reached.
For innate needs that cannot rapidly, if at all, be satiated by increasing consumption,
the welfare implications depend on the kind of adaptation mechanism that is triggered
by raising consumption. A significant case in point is the need for status and social
recognition. As discussed, income increases tend to fuel a status-consumption race in
the course of which all participants on average just tend to preserve their existing
relative status. For that reason, a continued growth of expenditures motivated by status
seeking alone (i.e. not including combination goods serving other motivations simul-
taneously) does not result in increased positional preference satisfaction. Awelfare gain
being absent, increased status expenditures can be argued to be a waste of resources
(Frank 1999, 2011).
The need for arousal is another significant case in point. The reason given above for
why continued increases in consumption fail to bring about an enduring satiation effect
in this case is a special form of endogenous preference change: hedonic adaptation (see
Frederik and Loewenstein 1999 on the latter). To be more specific consider the (now
time-indexed) partial utility function (1) specific to actions serving the need for arousal
(h=a). Suppose that at a time t<T a vector xo of goods and services maximizes ut<T
a
subject to the income constraint. Assume further that in t=T income increases so that,
everything else being equal, a consumption vector xo ′≠xo now maximizes Eq. (1). It
implies higher consumption expenditures and leads to a welfare gain since
uat¼T xo0ð Þ > uat¼T xoð Þ: ð5Þ
Now let hedonic adaptation develop its full effect until time t > T. This means that
the higher level of arousal that was attained by the income increase is eroded. The
partial utility function (1) is shifted downwards. The temporary welfare gain associated
with the expanded consumption disappears by and large such that
uat>T xo0ð Þ ≈ uat¼T xoð Þ: ð6Þ
Because of the stupefaction effect, stronger and usually more expensive stimuli are
necessary to (temporarily) bring back an elevated arousal and preference satisfaction.
Once further income increases make this feasible, the process starts anew. The
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comparison of the relationships (5) and (6) shows a time asymmetry in assessing
welfare gains from increased consumption that is typical in the presence of hedonic
adaptation. Whether or not there is a welfare improvement depends on whether a pre-
preference-change or a post-preference-change perspective is taken.19
In the case of preferences changes caused by conditioning learning (acquired wants)
and/or cognitive goal setting a welfare analysis in terms of the partial utility function (1)
is no longer possible. Instead, the relevant welfare measure is the (now time indexed)
total utility functional (3). However, the welfare effects of consumption growth are
ambiguous here too. The ambiguity relates not least to consumer innovations which
have been argued above to induce preference changes of this kind. While in politics and
in the public innovations are generally considered highly desirable nowadays, their
actual welfare effects may not support such a view. In order to make this point consider
a situation at a time t<T in which a vector xr of goods and services maximizes the
utility functional (3). If income were increased by an amount ΔI at that time, a
consumption vector xr ′= (xr ′ 1, …, xr ′m) ≠ xr would maximize the functional (3).
Everything else being equal, a higher consumption expenditures and a welfare gain
would occur because Ut <T(xr ′) > Ut <T(xr).
Now assume that an innovative consumer good s (like smart phone) is introduced to
the market at that time. Since the adaptation of preferences to innovations takes time,
the consumer does not immediately acquire a want for s and/or make it an object of
cognitive goal striving. Let this happen only at time T. This means that for t≥T both the
vector of goods and services is extended by the component s and the utility functional
by a corresponding new acquired want or cognitive goal. If it is a new cognitive goal
that is added, the total utility functional is thus given by
Ut ≥T ¼ φ u1t ≥T xlð Þ; …; unt ≥T xlð Þ; unþ1t ≥T xlð Þ; …; unþwt ≥T xlð Þ; unþwþ1t ≥T xlð Þ; …; unþwþgþ1t ≥T xlð Þ
h i
ð7Þ
with xl= (xl1, …, xlm, xls).For the sake of the argument assume that, after the new
preferences including s have been formed, income indeed happens to increase by the
amount ΔI. Let the maximization of Eq. (7) subject to the higher income result in the






> Ut ≥T xr0ð Þ: ð8Þ
This means that from a post-preference-change perspective underlying relation (8)
the increase in consumption expenditures, including the spending on the innovation,
results in a welfare gain. In such a perspective, foregoing the consumption of smart
phones, say, would amount to a welfare sacrifice. When considered from a pre-
preference-change point of view, however, the opposite holds:
Ut<T x*
 
< Ut<T xr0ð Þ; ð9Þ
19 The contradictory welfare assessments can be argued to point to a hedonic treadmill effect (Binswanger
2006). For an important part of their consumption, consumers make ever greater expenditures without ever
getting really happier. A similar argumentation also applies for the need for a positive self-image, but will not
be developed here for reasons of lacking space.
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because an expenditure on something that is not (yet) valued would result in a welfare
loss.
Thus, to the extent to which the secular growth of consumption is driven by newly
acquired wants and cognitive goal setting, it is an open question whether such growth
results in welfare gains. The answer depends on what time perspective is chosen for
measuring welfare. The reversal of the inequality sign in relations (8) and (9) means
that any of the welfare judgments regarding the growth of consumption is contestable.
Consumers in high-income economies usually choose the post-preference-change
perspective when making such assessments. This attitude is quite in line with a mindset
that emphatically welcomes stimulation through experiencing the novel things which
are readily supplied by the consumer goods industries. Post festum, the credo “more
consumption=better life” always turns true.
However, the ceaseless development of consumer innovations – with their influence
on acquired wants and cognitive goal setting – paves the way for further instances of
preference change. Consequently, every post-preference-change situation can be equal-
ly said to represent a pre-preference-change situation. Under such conditions, the
pursuit of enhanced preference satisfaction through expanding consumption becomes
a drift process. Its direction is contingent on what preferences happen to be learned
when. From a normative perspective, the ambiguity in assessing welfare is suggestive
of strong preference relativism. The choice of either the post-change or the pre-change
preferences as the measuring rod reflects an implicit value judgment. Utilitarian ethics
offers no criterion by which it could be decided which one to choose. If, perhaps as a
consequence of recognizing the preference relativism, a commitment to measuring
welfare from the pre-preference change perspective is made, one can control and
constrain one’s cognitive and non-cognitive learning processes.
There are indeed acute reasons for considering such a self-imposed moderation,
namely the private and social costs of the way in which consumption evolves and
grows. With respect to the private costs, the rising income that fuels expanding
consumption is not feasible without increasing effort and strain on the part of the
economic agents. In the high-income economies, doubts can be raised as to whether the
continued growth of consumption makes the agents happier (see also Helliwell et al.
2013). As mentioned, concerns about being caught in a hedonic treadmill may be
justified (see Binswanger 2006). The question is whether the additional consumption is
worth the greater effort and strain. This is particularly true also with respect to
consuming ever more new goods and services if one recognizes that their appreciation
has in many cases only recently been learned.
Concerning the social costs, doubts of whether additional consumption is worth it
are even more pronounced. Until now, the evolution of consumption has always
entailed the greater exploitation of materials, biomass, energy, atmosphere, fresh water,
and space. The ongoing changes to the global climate foreshadow the potential for
catastrophic future developments (McNeill 2000). If the social costs caused this way
had to fully be privately internalized, this would reduce the welfare gains whatever
measuring rod for welfare is chosen. The evolution of consumption would then take a
different path. However, even when there were hope for that to happen (which is not the
case), an evolution of consumption still following the mantra “more consumption=better
life”would be unlikely to be sustainable (see, e.g., theMillennium EcosystemAssessment
2005). Massive concerns are justified especially given that the developing countries with
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huge populations are likely to try to follow the lead of high-income countries on their path
of consumption growth.
As has frequently been criticized, once preference subjectivism is left behind, the
utilitarian focus on individual welfare provides much less of a normative orientation
than often believed (see Sartorius 2003, Gowdy 2005, Binder 2010). On the basis of the
motivational underpinnings discussed in the preceding sections a more differentiated
picture emerges that, in view of the mentioned private and social costs, suggests two
questions of normative relevance. Can it be ignored that in the richer countries ever
larger parts of the growing consumption are motivated by innate needs which induce
growing expenditures but improve preference satisfaction only temporarily or not at
all? Can it be ignored that much of the growing consumption is driven by a demand for
goods and services that would not be missed, had the preference for them not been
learned in the first place?
5 Conclusions
Modern microeconomic theory treats preferences as an unexplained “black box”. More
recent developments in behavioral economics, including the few contributions to
establishing a behavioral welfare theory, have basically left the black box untouched.
However, the theoretical lacuna makes it difficult to explain the evolution of consump-
tion and its welfare effects. In this paper it has been suggested to fill the theoretical
lacuna by an inquiry into the motivational foundations of economic behavior. To
accomplish this, one can draw on well-established research results from biology,
behavioral science, and psychology. In this way, the understanding of both the evolu-
tion of consumption and the conditions under which the equation “more
consumption=better life” holds, can be improved.
As a result of rising income, consumption activities in the developed world have
been scaled up over the past century to previously unprecedented levels. At the same
time, the composition of consumption has changed substantially as expressed in the
household expenditure statistics. By the same token, the consumer goods industries had
to massively restructure. The core thesis implied by the motivational foundations
advocated here is that the observed changes in consumption can be attributed to two
causal mechanisms.
The first mechanism rest on the fact that some of the motivations which drive
consumption activities start to unfold and change once the resources available for their
satisfaction are growing. These are the motivational forces arising from acquired wants
and cognitive goal setting whose transformations have been discussed in detail. New
preferences are then formed and the utility function is extended by new arguments. As
long as the ability to spend increases, consumption that is motivated in this fashion can
grow without bounds. Whether the corresponding growth process is welfare-enhancing
has been shown to depend on whether or not the most recent, i.e. the post-change,
preferences are used as the measuring rod for welfare. If such a moving measuring rod
is used it can be argued, however, that the very idea of a better life is subject to a drift
process which, in turn, implies a strong preference relativism.
The second causal mechanism relates to consumption motivations that result from
innate needs. When the ability to spend increases, some of them seem to be quite
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rapidly satiable when the consumption of goods serving them goes up. These needs
have been referred to as “basic needs” in development economics. Up to the satiation
point, expanding consumption results in welfare gains. However, unlike in the low-
income economies, signs pointing to stagnating demand and saturated markets for the
relevant products indicate that the level of satiation either has already been reached or is
closely approached in the high-income economies.
Other innate needs do not seem as rapidly satiable, at least not in a lasting way. The
needs for status and social recognitions and for cognitive and sensory stimulation
(arousal) have been discussed exemplarily for this type of needs. In the first case, it
can be doubted whether any welfare gain can be expected to result from raising the
corresponding expenditures. The status preference is a positional preference, and the
status position cannot be improved by raising expenditures as long as everyone engages
in a status consumption race. In the second case, increased spending does indeed result
in an improved need or preference satisfaction and, hence, a welfare gain. Yet this is
only a temporary effect. Due to hedonic adaptation (stupefaction) much or all of the
previous welfare gain disappears after a while.
Thus, unlike in low-income countries, the growing consumption in the high-income
economies is motivated in part by needs that are difficult to satiate and therefore
promise little, if any, welfare gains when expenditures are raised further. In part,
consumption growth is driven by newly emerging preferences whose satisfaction does,
or does not, result in welfare gains, depending on what state of the preferences is used
as measuring rod. Taking a normative perspective, both findings are problematic, given
the massive social costs and environmental threats of a continued consumption growth.
It does not seem easy under these conditions to provide a normatively convincing
legitimization for the calls for having even in the high-income economies ever more
consumption growth.
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